Browsing by Author "Prytherch, Ben, committee member"

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Open Access
A very confusing problem: interpreting Keynesian weight
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2022) Brekel, Josh, author; Kasser, Jeff, advisor; Shockley, Kenneth, committee member; Prytherch, Ben, committee member
Initially outlined by John Maynard Keynes in 1921, Keynesian weight is a measure intended to characterize evidence independently of probability. As a concept that is often immersed in confusion, Keynesian weight requires thorough philosophical explication prior to any sort of legitimate use in decision-making, legal proceedings, or scientific inquiry. In this thesis, I attempt to explicate Keynesian weight by arguing in favor of Jochen Runde's relative interpretation of Keynesian weight. The aim of Chapter 1 is to introduce the basic idea of Keynesian weight. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that Keynes's initial analysis of Keynesian weight creates an interpretative puzzle—two viable interpretations of Keynesian weight exist. Chapter 3 aims to solve the interpretative puzzle by consideration of how the interpretations of Keynesian weight respond to I.J. Good's criticism of Keynesian weight. Ultimately, I argue that Good's criticism demonstrates that the best interpretation of Keynesian weight is the relative interpretation.
Open Access
Doing better than truth: the conceptual engineering of a basic concept
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2025) Davis, Jordan, author; Kasser, Jeff, advisor; Rice, Collin, committee member; Prytherch, Ben, committee member
Truth can and should be replaced as a concept, or at least we should strongly consider doing so. Conceptual engineering is about determining what concepts we should use and the modification and creation of concepts to serve that purpose. One of the ongoing areas of research is determining just what the limits of conceptual engineering are. I approach this topic by exploring the possibility of conceptually engineering truth by replacing it as a concept and what that possibility means for replacing other concepts. More specifically, I use Kevin Scharp's proposal for replacing truth as model for how and why we might replace truth and how that might generalize to replacing other concepts. After a detailed discussion of the mechanics and motivations of Scharp's proposal, I argue that any substantive distinction between replacement and the revision fails because of the messiness of conceptual identity, and that, consequently, replacement is pervasive in conceptual engineering and philosophy more broadly. I continue by exploring various objections against the possibility and permissibility of replacement, focusing on truth in particular. I then show that under a framework where we treat concepts as tools that fulfill certain roles in addressing problems that those objections either fail or are defanged. I argue that such a framework is plausible based on how it approximates how we already think about things like concepts and the numerous benefits of adopting the framework. I explain how the framework addresses each objection both with respect to truth and basic concepts generally.