Guilty until proven innocent? Richard Whately and presumptive lenses in the Kavanaugh confirmation hearings

Abstract

In this thesis, I argue that nineteenth-century rhetorician Richard Whately was underrated in his time and is underutilized in rhetorical studies today. Drawing from Michael Sproule's scholarship concerning Whately's psychosocial approach to rhetorical theory, I demonstrate the utility of Whately's theories to evaluate a modern, case study: Justice Brett Kavanaugh's Confirmation Hearings to the Supreme Court in the fall of 2018.This thesis examines how Whately's concepts of presumption and burden of proof were pivotal in understanding this notorious rhetorical encounter. In an effort to extend Whately's original theories, I offer the concept of "presumptive lenses" to center the idea of perspective taking and how different argumentative frames can lead to confusion when both sides invoke the same terms but use very different burdens and evidentiary standards. The essence of "presumptive lenses" is to foster a practice in which all parties in a debate try to identify their opponents' understanding of presumption and burden of proof, to discuss it respectfully, and to honestly compare it to their own. The goal for the argumentative process is transparency for the rhetorical opponents, the judge, and the general public.