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Impulsive consumers and optimal social security

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dc.contributor.authorFindley, Thomas Scott, author
dc.contributor.authorKling, Robert W., advisor
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-13T19:26:16Z
dc.date.available2024-03-13T19:26:16Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstractUnfunded social security programs are primarily justified on grounds that individuals have specific behavioral tendencies that lead to inadequate saving for retirement. To date, very little has been pursued in the way of theory to analyze this justification. I design a new model of consumer behavior that is consistent with many of the salient features of evidence on impulsive consumption behavior. In my model, "impulsive consumers" optimally formulate long-term plans, but often deviate from these consumption programs upon experiencing a psychological impulse to uncontrollably consume above and beyond. In order to examine how impulsive consumers fare in an unfunded social security program, I calibrate my model to match specific empirical features of aggregate life-cycle consumption. After calibrating the model, I employ dynamic welfare measures and find: (i) a significant welfare cost to consuming impulsively; (ii) a social security program (calibrated to the current U.S. program) does not generally improve the welfare of impulsive consumers; (iii) social security almost never improves the welfare of impulsive consumers under future demographics; and, (iv) the optimal social security tax rate is drastically smaller than the current U.S. rate.
dc.format.mediumborn digital
dc.format.mediumdoctoral dissertations
dc.identifierETDF_Findley_2007_3279510.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10217/237726
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherColorado State University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartof2000-2019
dc.rightsCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.
dc.rights.licensePer the terms of a contractual agreement, all use of this item is limited to the non-commercial use of Colorado State University and its authorized users.
dc.subjectbounded rationality
dc.subjectdynamic optimization
dc.subjectimpulsive consumers
dc.subjectlife-cycle consumption
dc.subjectsocial security
dc.subjectmodels
dc.subjectstudies
dc.subjectbehavior
dc.subjectself control
dc.subjectdemographics
dc.subjectcalibration
dc.subjectboundary conditions
dc.subjectage
dc.subjecthypotheses
dc.subjectparticipation
dc.subjectplanning
dc.subjectcopyright
dc.subjectmouth
dc.subjectfingers and toes
dc.titleImpulsive consumers and optimal social security
dc.typeText
dcterms.rights.dplaThis Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights (https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/). You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorColorado State University
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

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